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"READING" JUSTICE SANDRA DAY
O'CONNOR
Carl R. Schenker, Jr. *
On September 25, 1981, Judge Sandra Day O'Connor of the Court of
Appeals of Arizona took the oath of office as an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States. Justice O'Connor's elevation to the
Court should be of great interest to state and local governments because
her extensive prior involvement in local government should give her an
unusual perspective in cases before the Court implicating state or local
interests.
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice O'Connor has served previously as an assistant state attorney
general, a state legislator, and a state trial and intermediate appellate court
judge. Thus, her professional experiences have been intensely "local" and
presumably have versed her thoroughly in many of the problems con-
fronting state and local governments. By contrast, most of the sitting Jus-
tices were working within a "federal" context at the time of appointment to
the Court. When nominated, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens were all sitting on United States Courts of Ap-
peals; Justices White and Rehnquist were serving as senior officials in the
Department of Justice. And neither of the other members of the Court,
Justices Brennan and Powell, had as wide a variety of experiences in state
and local government as Justice O'Connor.
Popular publicity concerning Justice O'Connor has emphasized that she
is the first woman to sit on the Court, rather than that her experience has
been in local government. Yet, it seems likely that there will be many more
occasions on which her local government experiences might give her an
unusual perspective. Indeed, of the first twenty-two cases decided by full
opinions in the Court's 1982 Term, at least eight directly involved interests
of state or local governments: Fair Assessment in Real Estate Association v.
McNary' (barring damage actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged un-
* B.A. 1971, Stanford University; J.D. 1974, Stanford Law School. Mr. Schenker is a
partner at O'Melveny & Myers in Washington, D.C.
1. 102 S. Ct. 177 (1981).
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constitutional administration of a state tax system); Watt v. Energy Action
Educational Foundation2 (rejecting a state's challenge to Department of the
Interior practices for leasing offshore oil and gas resources); Widmar v.
Vincent 3 (overturning a state university's exclusion of a student religious
group from campus facilities); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of
Berkeley4 (invalidating a municipal ordinance limiting financial contribu-
tions to political committees); Polk County v. Dodson5 (holding that a pub-
lic defender does not act "under color of state law" for purposes of 42
U.S.C. § 1983); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido6 (upholding a requirement that
state probation officers be citizens); Texaco, Inc. v. Short7 (upholding a
state statute terminating certain unused mineral rights); and Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder' (subjecting local governments to
possible antitrust liability for certain regulatory actions).9
Of course, a familiarity with "local" problems does not guarantee sym-
pathy for state or local interests, nor does it necessarily create a belief that
local officials are able and willing to respond appropriately to local condi-
tions that touch upon federal rights and interests. For example, despite his
background as a state judge, Justice Brennan has been a vigorous exponent
of expansive federal habeas corpus review of state criminal convictions. o
And any number of federal district court judges familiar with local con-
cerns have found it necessary to intervene in the running of state prison
systems, local school districts, and the like."
2. 102 S. Ct. 205 (1981).
3. 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981).
4. 102 S. Ct. 434 (1981).
5. 102 S. Ct. 445 (1981).
6. 102 S. Ct. 735 (1982).
7. 102 S. Ct. 781 (1982).
8. 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
9. By contrast, the only case among those 22 with overt implications for women's inter-
csts was Ridgway v. Ridgway, 102 S. Ct. 49 (1981), upholding a serviceman's right under a
federal statute to designate a life insurance beneficiary other than as provided for in a state
court divorce decree. Justice O'Connor did not participate in Ridgway. However, in Bugh v.
Bugh, 125 Ariz. App. 190, 608 P.2d 329 (Ct. App. Div. 1, 1980), she authored an opinion
holding that worker's compensation benefits received after divorce were the separate prop-
erty of the husband.
10. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 99 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 502 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Francis v. Henderson,
425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
11. See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F. Supp. 122 (D. Colo. 1979), modfed, 639 F.2d 559
(10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Booker v. Special School Dist. No. 1,451
F. Supp. 659 (D. Minn.), aft'd, 585 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979)
(administration of school desegregation plans); Smiley v. Vollert, 433 F. Supp. 463 (S.D.
Tex. 1978), modfed sub nonL Smiley v. Blevins, 514 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D. Tex. 1981);
Laaman v. Hedgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.H. 1977) (administration of prisons).
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However, a 1981 lecture by then Judge O'Connor contains strong indi-
cations that she is often likely to be in sympathy with those members of the
Court (Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist, and less predictably, Jus-
tice Powell) who most frequently tend to presume the responsiveness of
local officials and uphold the interests of state and local governments as-
serted before the Court. In her lecture, entitled Trends in the Relationship
Between the Federal and State Courts from the Perspective of a State Court
Judge, 2 Justice O'Connor applauded "the recent trend in the United
States Supreme Court shifting to the state courts some additional responsi-
bility for determination of federal constitutional questions in state criminal
cases."13 She also noted: "Among the proposals [to restrict federal court
jurisdiction] which have merit from the perspective of a state court judge
are the elimination or restriction of federal court diversity jurisdiction, and
a requirement of exhaustion of state remedies as a prerequisite to bringing
a federal action under section 1983."' 4 Justice O'Connor favored more
deference to state courts because "[tlhere is no reason to assume that state
court judges cannot and will not provide a 'hospitable forum' in litigating
federal constitutional questions."' 5
If the attitude reflected in Justice O'Connor's lecture carries over into
her votes, the Burger-Rehnquist-Powell orientation may command the al-
legiance of a fourth Justice. And her early voting on the Supreme Court
has tended to support the state or local government interest in closely di-
vided cases. In the eight Supreme Court cases involving state or local inter-
ests noted above, Justice O'Connor voted against the state or local
government interest three times-in the offshore leasing case," in the uni-
versity facilities case,' 7 and in the municipal election case,'" but in each
instance with a substantial majority of the Court. She voted squarely in
favor of the local government interest four times-with the majority, in the
eight-to-one public defender case, 19 in the five-to-four citizenship require-
12. O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courtsfrom the
Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801 (1981).
13. Id at 802.
14. Id at 815.
15. Id at 813 (quoting Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Sumner v. Mata, 101 S.
Ct. 764, 770 (1981)):
State judges as well as federal judges swear allegiance to the Constitution of the
United States, and there is no reason to think that because of their frequent differ-
ences of opinions as to how that document should be interpreted that all are not
doing their mortal best to discharge their oath of office.
16. Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 102 S. Ct. 205 (1981).
17. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981).
18. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 102 S. Ct. 434 (1981).
19. Polk County v. Dodson, 102 S. Ct. 445 (1981).
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ment case, 2° and in the five-to-four mineral interest case;2 ' and in dissent,
with the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist, in the five-to-three antitrust
liability case.22
However, Justice O'Connor's votes in her eighth Supreme Court case,
Fair Assessment in Real Estate Association v. McNary,2" and in a number
of her state court cases, suggest that advocates would be ill-advised to as-
sume her vote and direct their briefs only at the somewhat unpredictable
"swing" votes of Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice
O'Connor's decisions suggest an open-mindedness that may stamp her as
another swing vote. Moreover, like other judges, she is likely to be affected
by her personal views and experiences in approaching particular issues,
and the results may sometimes be unexpected, as illustrated by her vote in
McNary.
In McNary, the question was whether a state taxpayer may bring a dam-
age action in federal court under section 1983 for allegedly unconstitu-
tional administration of the state tax system. A five Justice majority held
that, in light of the "important and sensitive nature of state tax systems, "24
principles of comity bar such taxpayer damage actions, just as the Tax
Injunction Act bars injunctive actions against the enforcement of state
taxes. Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion of the Court and was joined by
the Chief Justice and Justices White, Blackmun, and Powell. Justice
O'Connor, along with Justices Marshall and Stevens, joined the concurring
opinion by Justice Brennan. Justice Brennan rejected the majority's flat
bar to such actions but concluded that the suit in question had been prop-
erly dismissed. He reasoned that, in the tax context, the plaintiffs should
have exhausted their state administrative remedies before seeking to in-
voke federal jurisdiction (although such exhaustion has not been required
under section 1983 in other contexts).25 Thus, Justice O'Connor declined
to join a majority opinion which offered broad protection for the state in-
terests in administration of tax systems and instead joined a narrower
opinion which simply imposed an exhaustion requirement. This may re-
flect her prior view, as expressed in her lecture, that an exhaustion require-
ment should be imposed more generally under section 1983.
20. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 102 S. Ct. 735 (1982).
21. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 102 S. Ct. 781 (1982).
22. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
23. 102 S. Ct. 177 (1981).
24. Id at 179.
25. See, e.g., Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 432 (1975) (challenge to the constitutionality
of littering statute); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 574 (1973) (challenge to Alabama
statutory scheme regulating optometry practice).
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Justice O'Connor's vote in McNary emphasizes the opportunity for
Supreme Court advocates to win what might seem unlikely votes by ap-
pealing effectively to the personal views and experiences of individual Jus-
tices. 26 Once a Justice has a substantial voting record at the Supreme
Court, those who follow the Court closely, such as the Solicitor General of
the United States, develop a feel for the type of arguments that appeal to
that Justice. Until Justice O'Connor evolves such a record over a number
of terms, however, advocates before the Court should consider consulting
her rulings while on the state court.2 7
The predictive value of her lower court rulings is, of course, somewhat
limited by the nature of the courts on which she sat. The chart below sum-
marizes the types of cases in which Justice O'Connor participated as an
appellate judge.28 Although the classifications are necessarily arbitrary, it
is clear that her prior judicial experience did not expose her regularly to
federal statutory and constitutional issues.
26. If true, an anecdote related about Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), by a clerk
resident at the Court during the 1960 Term also illustrates vividly the opportunity to garner
votes in unlikely places. As a general proposition, Justice Clark was less likely than many of
his colleagues on the Warren Court to uphold federal constitutional claims in criminal cases.
But, as a young lawyer, he apparently had lost a criminal case when federal law enforcement
officers turned over evidence suppressable in a federal case to state officers, who obtained a
state conviction. The imbalance in .the exclusionary rule had rankled Justice Clark for years
when Mapp reached the Supreme Court. Although the case was briefed and argued prima-
rily on first amendment grounds because the materials eventually suppressed were porno-
graphic, Justice Clark seized upon the fourth amendment issues in the case and persuaded
his colleagues to extend the exclusionary rule to the states.
27. Studying lower court opinions is helpful not only as an initial educational tool but
also in the actual litigation of particular cases. Citation of lower court opinions written by
even an experienced Justice is often helpful to remind the Justice of previously held views.
28. The 82 cases reflected in the chart include: (1) 39 opinions written on the court of
appeals; (2) 40 other cases in which she participated on the court of appeals; (3) one opinion
written while sitting by designation on the Supreme Court of Arizona; and (4) two other
opinions in which she participated while sitting on the supreme court. Justice O'Connor
never filed or joined a concurrence or dissent on the state bench.
The LEXIS search on which the chart is based was completed on January 17, 1982. Since
Justice O'Connor's trial court opinions are not available in LEXIS, the only trial court cases
discussed in this article are those in which she was identified as the trial judge in appeals to
the court of appeals or the Supreme Court of Arizona.
It may be of interest to note that 13 of Justice O'Connor's trial-court decisions have been
considered in the court of appeals, where two were reversed and eleven were affirmed. Ten
of her decisions reached the Supreme Court of Arizona, which affirmed five, reversed four,
and reversed in part and affirmed in part one decision.
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STATE APPELLATE CASES IN WHICH JUSTICE O'CONNOR PARTICIPATED
1. Civil Cases
General Civil Cases
Federal constitutional issues ........................ 3
Government employee issues ........................ 2
Commercial disputes ................................ 5
Consumer disputes ................................. 2
Torts .............................................. 7
Family law issues .................................. 4
Civil Procedure .................................... 2
E vidence .......................................... 4
M iscellaneous ..................................... 4
Unemployment Insurance
Statutory interpretation ............................ 4
Substantial evidence ............................... 5
Procedural issues .................................. 1
Workmen's Compensation
Statutory interpretation ............................ .11
Substantial evidence ............................... 7
Procedural issues .................................. 4
2. Criminal Cases ....................................... 17
TOTAL ...................... 82
Notwithstanding the nonfederal nature of most of the cases she decided
below, however, Justice O'Connor did participate in a number of cases
that may be of interest to state and local government lawyers appearing
before the Supreme Court. The most relevant cases are discussed briefly
below to provide a starting point for the advocate preparing such a case.
The discussion will not assess the merits of the decisions reached, although
that process would be an important part of preparing a particular case. In
addition, a lower court judge has less opportunity to develop his or her
own views than does a Justice.
II. SPECIFIC AREAS
Taxing Power. As a lower court judge, Justice O'Connor participated in
four cases challenging taxes imposed by state or local governments. She
voted twice to invalidate and twice to sustain the local tax.
One of her tax cases, which eventually reached the United States
Supreme Court in Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission,29
clearly demonstrates that Justice O'Connor is not an entirely predictable
29. 448 U.S. 160 (1980).
Justice O'Connor
vote when state or local interests come into conffict with the interests of the
federal government. There, in an unreported trial-court opinion later vin-
dicated by the United States Supreme Court, she ruled that a state tax was
preempted by federal Indian policy.
The taxpayer, Central, solicited sales on the Gila River Indian Reserva-
tion and eventually obtained a contract to sell tractors to a reservation
enterprise. Central's premises were not located on the reservation, nor was
Central licensed to trade with Indians. The local Bureau of Indian Affairs
Superintendent, however, had approved the transaction. Under Warren
Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Commission,3" the sale would have been ex-
empt from state sales tax if it had been made by a licensed trader located
on the reservation. As an unlicensed trader, Central calculated and paid
the tax under protest but then filed for recovery, stipulating that any recov-
ery would be paid to the Indian enterprise.
Justice O'Connor entered summary judgment for Central on the author-
ity of Warren, apparently reasoning that Warren precluded imposition of
an economic burden on the Indians whether or not the Bureau of Indian
Affairs Superintendent had required Central to obtain a license. As quoted
by the dissent in the Supreme Court of Arizona, her opinion stated:
Nowhere do the federal statutes and regulations indicate that
noncompliance by a trader or the Bureau of Indian Affairs [with
the licensing regulations] will allow imposition of state laws
which would otherwise be inapplicable. It is the existence of the
federal laws and accompanying regulations and not their en-
forcement which preempts the State's ability to tax the transac-
tion in question.3
The Supreme Court of Arizona reversed, over a vigorous dissent in de-
fense of Justice O'Connor's opinion, finding that the case was "clearly dis-
tinguishable" from Warren because Central was an unlicensed trader. The
majority was of the view that, even if the economic burden fell on the
Indians, imposition of the tax did "not run afoul of any congressional en-
actments passed to protect and guard [the federal government's] Indian
wards."32
Central then appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which held,
in a five-to-four opinion, that the transaction could not be taxed. Echoing
Justice O'Connor's language below, the Court concluded that it was irrele-
vant that Central was not a licensed Indian trader: "It is the existence of
the Indian trader statutes, then, and not their administration, that
30. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
31. State v. Central Machinery Co., 121 Ariz. 183, 186, 589 P.2d 426, 429 (1976).
32. Id at 184, 589 P.2d at 427.
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preempts the field of transactions with Indians occurring on reserva-
tions."' 33 Justice O'Connor's predecessor, Justice Stewart, filed a dissenting
opinion joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. The dissent ar-
gued that the case should be distinguished from Warren because taxation
of Central's isolated transaction with the tribe enterprise would not
threaten the statutory policies protecting Indians against unfair prices, as
would the routine taxation of the ongoing business of a licensed trader on
the reservation.34
A second tax case, Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and
Power District v. City of Phoenix,3 5 involved a conflict between the inter-
ests of two different bodies of local government. There, Justice O'Connor
joined an opinion invalidating the tax, and the result may illuminate her
views on intergovernmental immunity. In Salt River, the City of Phoenix
attempted to impose its privilege license (excise) tax on the sale of electric-
ity by the Salt River District to the Roosevelt Irrigation District. Salt River
was organized under the Reclamation Act of 190236 to irrigate arid lands
and drain wet lands. Both Salt River and Roosevelt were political subdivi-
sions of the state and municipal corporations. Salt River contracted to sell
nonsurplus electricity to Roosevelt at cost, along with certain equipment,
in exchange for Roosevelt's irrigating and draining Salt River project
lands. Phoenix attempted to impose its excise tax on the proceeds of the
sale of electricity.
Salt River contended that it was immune from taxation under the Ari-
zona Constitution; Phoenix relied on previous cases holding that Salt
River's retail sales of surplus electricity were subject to tax. The panel held
that Salt River's sales to Roosevelt were immune from taxation, because
the nonsurplus electricity was sold to support the basic governmental pur-
poses of the district:
We hold that the [Salt River] Project serves a governmental func-
tion while engaged in the primary public purpose for which it
was authorized and formed: the reclamation and irrigation of
33. 448 U.S. at 165 (footnote omitted).
34. In another interesting case, Justice O'Connor also applied a federal statute where
others might have sought not to. While sitting as trial judge in a murder case, Justice
O'Connor suppressed vital evidence obtained when bored telephone operators eavesdropped
on an emergency call. Even though the operators were acting strictly in a private capacity,
Justice O'Connor held that exclusion was required by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520. Suppression of the evidence was
affirmed in State v. Dwyer, 120 Ariz. 291, 585 P.2d 900 (Ct. App. Div. 1, 1978), over a special
concurrence in which Judge Wren stated that he had "searched in vain for a legal premise
upon which to dissent from this bizarre result." Id at 295, 585 P.2d at 904.
35. 631 P.2d 553 (Ct. App. Div. 1, 1981).
36. 43 U.S.C. § 371 (1976).
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arid lands, the drainage of waterlogged lands, and the production
of electricity for these purposes ...
The incidence of the City's excise tax is on the Salt River Pro-
ject's sale of nonsurplus electricity, at cost, to Roosevelt District,
under the Water Contract. The electricity sold to Roosevelt Dis-
trict is used to accomplish the primary governmental purpose of
each: drainage and irrigation. This is not, then, a tax on "surplus"
electric sales incidental to the primary purpose of the Salt River
Project, but rather it is a [prohibited] tax on the primary purposes
of both the Project and Roosevelt District.37
Where the competing interests in a state or local tax case were those of
private business, rather than other levels of government, Justice O'Connor
twice voted to sustain the taxing authority, suggesting that she does not
have a "taxpayer's" orientation in every case. J C Penney Co. v. Arizona
Department of Revenue 3' arose from Arizona's "rental occupancy tax."39
Prior to enactment of the rental occupancy tax, Arizona imposed a two
percent tax on rents received by landlords for leases entered into after
1967. The exemption for "preexisting" leases was enacted in the belief that,
under such leases, landlords would be unable to pass the tax on to their
tenants, while the tax could be passed on in the case of new leases. In 1974,
however, Arizona imposed a two percent rental occupancy tax directly on
the tenants occupying premises under preexisting leases.
The tax on landlords had never been imposed on tax-immune state or
federal entities. When the legislature enacted the rental occupancy tax on
tenants, it chose to exempt tenants when "the constitution or laws of the
United States or this state would prohibit this state from taxing were the
landlord to be the tenant."' In other words, Arizona created a tax classifi-
cation favoring the tenants of tax-exempt landlords. Many states appar-
ently have taken the opposite approach, imposing a general rental tax on
nonexempt landlords and supplementing it with a rental occupancy tax on
the tenants of tax-exempt landlords, the goal being to equalize the eco-
nomic burden between the classes of tenants.4 '
A tenant of a nonexempt landlord under a preexisting lease challenged
the rental occupancy tax on the ground that it denied equal protection by
favoring the tenants of tax-exempt landlords. Justice O'Connor held, for a
37. 631 P.2d at 556-57.
38. 125 Ariz. 469, 610 P.2d 471 (Ct. App. Div. 1, 1980).
39. The case illuminates Justice O'Connor's views on equal protection analysis, as well
as on taxing power. See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
40. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-1712(2) (1980).
41. See 125 Ariz. at 473-74, 610 P.2d at 474-76.
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unanimous panel, that the classification was permissible. She began by em-
phasizing that a tax is to be presumed constitutional and that the chal-
lenger "has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the
classifications rest upon some reasonable basis and are not purely arbi-
trary., 42 She then determined that the legislation served a legitimate legis-
lative desire "to maintain equality between the two taxes. 43 That
legislative goal required that "the lease should be exempt from the rental
occupancy tax when the lessor is a tax-immune entity inasmuch as the
same lease would be exempt from the transaction privilege tax on rental
income if the lessor were a tax-immune entity." 4 To measure the rational-
ity of the classification exempting from tax the tenants of tax-exempt land-
lords, she relied principally on the line of cases holding that local
governments have broad flexibility to impose a privilege tax on an entity
doing business with a tax-exempt entity. Recognizing that the typical
scheme seeks to equalize the burden on tenants, she nonetheless found that
Arizona's scheme was constitutionally justified because it was rationally
designed to preserve the inequality between classes.
As a trial judge, Justice O'Connor also upheld application to a private
business of the Phoenix privilege tax invalidated in Salt River, and was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Arizona in Univar Corp. v. City of Phoe-
nix." Phoenix sought to tax certain gross sales revenues earned by a busi-
ness that maintained a warehouse in Phoenix, even though the actual sales
of stock were made at locations outside the city. Univar contended that the
city had violated the city charter and state constitution by imposing a tax
beyond its borders. The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed Justice
O'Connor's determination that the charter and constitution both permitted
the tax in question.
Rights of Government Employees. Justice O'Connor participated in two
cases concerning disciplinary actions against government employees and
presenting facts similar to those often found in Supreme Court cases. Both
cases suggest that she may be prepared to insist on the strict observance of
due process formalities, but the second case also suggests that it may be
difficult to persuade her to second-guess the substantive validity of termi-
nation or nonretention decisions reached by state or local government
employers.
In Orth v. Phoenix Union High School System,' Justice O'Connor con-
42. Id at 472, 610 P.2d at 474 (citations omitted).
43. Id at 474, 610 P.2d at 476 (emphasis added).
44. Id
45. 122 Ariz. 220, 594 P.2d 86 (1979).
46. 126 Ariz. 151, 613 P.2d 311 (Ct. App. Div. 1, 1980).
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curred in a unanimous decision that the school board had failed to follow
statutory procedures in dismissing a teacher for classroom inadequacy.
The statute provided that the school board or its representative was re-
quired to give a teacher ninety days notice of intention to dismiss for class-
room inadequacy, "specifying the nature thereof with such specific
instances of behavior and with such particularity as to furnish the teacher
an opportunity to correct his faults and overcome the grounds for such
charge."47 The teacher was informed of negative performance ratings over
an extended period but eventually received only thirty days specific notice
of intent to dismiss. The panel held that "notice provisions . . must be
strictly followed"48 and that adverse performance evaluations not explic-
itly linked to possible termination did not suffice as the requisite warning.
The panel even added dictum that the general authority of the principal
over teacher performance did not necessarily empower him to give the
statutory notice.
Justice O'Connor showed a similar insistence that prescribed procedures
be followed in Cooper v. Arizona Western College District Governing
Board.9 Arizona's equivalent of the Sunshine-in-Government Act pro-
vided that "governing bodies" could take "legal action" only in public ses-
sion, although executive sessions could be held for preliminary discussion
of, among other things, personnel decisions.5" In Cooper, the Board con-
vened a properly noticed public meeting and went into executive session
twice during the day. At the end of the day, the Board formally announced
that the next meeting would be a week later, but selected public attendees
were informed that the Board would convene the following day. In that
session, the Board determined not to renew the contracts of eight staff
members. The staff members were notified immediately, and the action
was publicly announced at the scheduled session the following week.
The staff members sought both a judicial declaration that the nonre-
newal decisions were void and an injunction against future violations of
the open-meeting law. Justice O'Connor's opinion for a unanimous panel
held that the nonrenewals were "legal actions" required to be taken in a
public meeting. She therefore held that any action taken in executive ses-
sion during the first meeting or at the unpublicized session was invalid. But
she went on to hold that an invalid decision could be rehabilitated by ap-
proval at a properly announced public meeting. The case was remanded
for consideration of whether the Board's public announcement constituted
47. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-265 (1974).
48. 126 Ariz. at 153, 613 P.2d at 313.
49. 125 Ariz. 463, 610 P.2d 465 (Ct. App. Div. 1, 1980).
50. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-431.03 (1974).
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an approval or a mere notice. The opinion expressed no suspicion of the
Board's good faith, despite the somewhat conspiratorial method in which
the second day's session was convened. Nor was there any consideration in
the opinion of the possible need for safeguards to assure that the "legal
action" was not impermissibly tainted by the prior invalid procedures.
Municipal Tort Liability. Recent years have seen a considerable expan-
sion of plaintiffs' ability to bring damage actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for violation of federal rights.5' As noted above, Justice O'Connor recom-
mended in her 1981 lecture that exhaustion of state court remedies be re-
quired prior to the filing of section 1983 suits in federal court, suggesting
that "[wie should allow the state courts to rule first on the constitutionality
of state statutes."52 This, however, may also reflect some dissatisfaction
with the very concept of damage suits under section 1983. She noted that
"[ejven state court judges are not immune from a section 1983 suit"'53 and
that "state courts, . state legislatures and executive officers" would wel-
come congressional limits on the use of section 1983. 54
An advocate with a section 1983 case before the Court would be well-
advised to study her lecture on that subject for insights on her likely vote.
Moreover, since section 1983 actions are essentially tort actions, advocates
with such cases should consider consulting her lower court tort cases, espe-
cially the two cases involving municipal tort liability.
55
Justice O'Connor sat as the trial judge in the case affirmed in Chavez v.
Tolleson Elementary School District.56 Chavez involved a wrongful death
action against a school district brought by the parents of a ten-year old
who left her school grounds and was abducted and slain. The parents, al-
leging the school's negligence in supervising their child, obtained a jury
verdict but Justice O'Connor granted judgment n.o.v. on the ground that
plaintiffs had "failed to establish by the evidence the standard of care re-
51. fee, e.g, Hendriksen v. Bentley, 644 F.2d 852 (10th Cir. 1981) (denial of access to
courts); Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1981) (damages for false imprisonment);
Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 931 (1981)
(alleged defamation by city and state officials); McCulloch v. Glasgow, 620 F.2d 47 (5th Cir.
1980) (damages for heart attack suffered during a wrongful government taking of private
property); Chavez v. City of Santa Fe Hous. Auth., 606 F.2d 282 (10th Cir. 1979) (action by
tenants against assessments); Meredith v. Arizona, 533 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1975) (assault of
inmate by prison guard).
52. O'Connor, supra note 12, at 815.
53. Id at 809.
54. Id at 810.
55. A third case involving the financial liability of a local government, St. Joseph's
Hosp, & Medical Center v. Maricopa County, 635 P.2d 527 (Ct. App. Div. 1, 1981), is dis-
cussed infra at text accompanying notes 64-67.
56. 122 Ariz. 472, 595 P.2d 1017 (Ct. App. Div. 1, 1979).
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quired by the school district. . . ."" While the exact meaning of her dis-
position is unclear, it could be interpreted to suggest some disinclination to
subject government officials to ordinary principles of tort liability.
The appellate court affirmed, but rejected her rationale. It ruled that the
school district had a duty to exercise ordinary reasonable care in supervi-
sion of pupils and that no specific proof was required to establish the
bounds of this duty. The court concluded, however, that the possibility that
a child might be abducted and slain was not a foreseeable risk against
which the school was required to take precautions.
Justice O'Connor showed more sympathy for the plaintiff's claim in her
opinion for a unanimous panel in Lowman v. City of Mesa.5" There, the
plaintiff suffered personal injuries when her vehicle struck another vehicle
that had been abandoned on the city streets for eighteen hours. Justice
O'Connor attempted to reconcile two divergent threads of Arizona law
concerning municipal liability. On the one hand, municipalities have a
common law duty to individual motorists to maintain roads in a safe con-
dition and thus are liable for hazards such as potholes. On the other hand,
municipalities have only a generalized duty to enforce laws, and ordinarily
are not liable to individuals for accidents caused, for example, by drunken
drivers the police have not arrested. Justice O'Connor held that the aban-
doned car constituted a hazard within the first line of cases and remanded
for consideration of whether the city had violated its duty to remove the
hazard within a reasonable time or to warn of its existence. Despite the
ruling for the plaintiff, Lowman also suggests that Justice O'Connor ordi-
narily may be somewhat reluctant to impose tort liability on local govern-
ments, since she emphasized that plaintiff's claim was rooted in the city's
duties as a particular kind of property owner and sharply distinguished
other governmental functions:
Other Arizona cases have found only a general duty to the public
and have refused to impose liability on the governmental entity
for individual injuries. See Bagley v. State, 122 Ariz. 365, 595
P.2d 157 (1979) (failure of mine inspector to shut down a mine
violating safety standards); McGeorge v. City of Phoenix, 117
Ariz. 272, 572 P.2d 100 (App. 1977) (failure of police to detain a
person known to police to have violent tendencies or failure to
warn decedent of those tendencies); Ivicevic v. City of Glendale,
26 Ariz. App. 460, 549 P.2d 240 (1976) (failure of police to pre-
vent intoxicated person from driving); Duran v. City of Tucson, 20
Ariz. App. 22, 509 P.2d 1059 (1973) (failure of fire department
57. 122 Ariz. at 474, 595 P.2d at 1019.
58. 125 Ariz. 590, 611 P.2d 943 (Ct. App. Div. 1, 1980).
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officials to enforce fire code). Cf. Grimm v. Arizona Board of Par-
dons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 1227 (1977) (duty of
Parole Board narrowed to an individual one by assumption of
control by Board over dangerous parolee).
In this case, the Mesa City Code § I0-3-29(A)(3) authorizes the
city police to remove unattended vehicles . . . Any duty of the
police by virtue of the code to remove such a vehicle is one owed
to the public generally and the failure of the police to [do so]...
would not ordinarily give rise to liability to a member of the pub-
lic. . . . However, the city has a common law duty owed to all
users of city streets to keep them reasonably safe . . . . It is an
alleged breach of this duty which appellant is entitled to have
considered by the trier of fact.5 9
Eminent Domain. In Texaco, Inc. v. Short,6 ° Justice O'Connor joined
Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court upholding a state statute which reg-
ulated severed mineral interests. The statute provided that, unless the min-
eral owner files a claim statement in the local county recorder's office,
certain severed mineral interests would automatically lapse after twenty
years of nonuse and revert to the current surface owner of the property.
The Court rejected, among other contentions, the claim that the statute
took property without just compensation, reasoning that it was "the own-
er's failure to make any use of the property-and not the action of the
State-that causes the lapse of the property right." Thus, the Court con-
cluded that no compensable "taking" occurred upon extinguishment of the
severed mineral rights.6 '
The factual context of Texaco, Inc. bears an interesting resemblance to
Justice O'Connor's only state court case dealing directly with local govern-
ment powers over land use. In Sende Vista Water Co. v. City of Phoenix,6 2
the city entered into a contract with a developer, Presley, for construction
of a water delivery system for Presley's newly-constructed subdivision. Af-
ter construction, the city was to purchase and operate the system. However,
fifteen years previously another company, Sende Vista, had been issued a
certificate of convenience and necessity for construction of a public water
system to serve a 360-acre area included within the subdivision. Sende
Vista had never constructed any portion of the public water system author-
ized by its certificate.
Sende Vista sued for a permanent injunction against the city's contract
59. 125 Ariz. at 593, 611 P.2d at 946 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
60. 102 S. Ct. 781 (1982).
61. Id at 792.
62. 127 Ariz. 42, 617 P.2d 1158 (Ct. App. Div. 1, 1980).
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with Presley. The injunction was granted by the trial court, but Justice
O'Connor substantially modified it in an opinion for a unanimous panel.
She held that, under Arizona law, the city could not operate a water system
within the area of Sende Vista's certificate without first condemning the
certificate, even though "the holder of the certificate of convenience and
necessity has not yet constructed facilities and the only property taken is
the certificate itself."63 Thus, pending condemnation of the certificate, an
injunction against construction or operation by Presley of a water system
in the 360-acre area was proper. Presley, however, was free to proceed with
construction of facilities on the remainder of the subdivision, and the city
was free to initiate condemnation proceedings against Sende Vista's certifi-
cate of convenience and necessity.
The peculiarities of Texaco, Inc., and Sende Vista make it very difficult
to predict Justice O'Connor's future votes in cases involving land use regu-
lation. Her willingness to protect the inactive certificate of convenience
and necessity in Sende Vista suggests that she may favor compensation in
contexts resembling conventional takings. But her vote in Texaco, Inc.
seems to recognize the existence of broad authority in local governments to
regulate land use without compensation where the government is not di-
rectly taking property for government use.
Justice O'Connor also confronted a taking question outside the real
property context in what appears to have been her last opinion for the
Arizona Court of Appeals. In St. Joseph's Hospital and Medical Center v.
Maricopa County,6 a hospital brought suit against Maricopa County to be
reimbursed for emergency medical care provided to an indigent patient.
Under Arizona law, private hospitals apparently are required to accept in-
digents for emergency medical care, but the counties must reimburse the
hospitals for such care. An "indigent" is defined as an individual with an-
nual net income of $2,100 or less, after medical expenses. A patient with an
income of approximately $4,600 was admitted to St. Joseph's for emer-
gency care and eventually removed to the county hospital. St. Joseph's
billed the county at its normal rates for paying patients and successfully
sued for that amount in the trial court.
On appeal, Justice O'Connor's opinion for the panel rejected the
county's contention that it had no obligation to reimburse St. Joseph's be-
cause the patient had not been indigent when admitted. However, her
opinion modified the lower court's award of the hospital's standard
charges. She ruled that approximately $2,500 of the bill, representing the
63. Id at 45, 617 P.2d at 1161.
64. 635 P.2d 527 (Ct. App. Div. 1, 1981).
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difference between the patient's gross income and the indigency level,
should be disallowed. She held that, as to the balance of the bill, St. Jo-
seph's was not entitled to reimbursement at its standard rate, but only for
the actual cost of the care.
St. Joseph's argued that the combination of its obligation to accept the
indigent patient and the limitations on its reimbursement unconstitution-
ally deprived it of property without just compensation. An amicus curiae
argued that compensation at cost "would result in an inequitable 'tax lev-
ied upon the [non-indigent] sick,' and that these costs should more prop-
erly be distributed among the county taxpayers at large."6 5 Justice
O'Connor held that the $2,500 disallowance did not constitute a taking
because it was the patient's "personal responsibility" and "St. Joseph's
bore the risk that its bill would not be paid just as it does when treating
any paying patient."66 She also held that reimbursement at cost did not
constitute a taking even though "private hospitals may have to charge their
paying patients more to establish a reasonable profit."67
Equal Protection. Justice O'Connor's 1981 lecture emphasized the fre-
quency with which "the federal guaranty of equal protection of the laws
has resulted in court review" of state and local laws.68 Her lower court
votes provide some insight into her likely approach to equal protection
issues.
As already noted in the discussion ofJ C Penney Co., Justice O'Connor
rejected the taxpayer's equal protection claim because of the abstract ra-
tionality of the tax structure, without examining the actual impact on tax-
payers.69 A somewhat similar approach was adopted by the court in
Pastore v. Arizona Department of Economic Securi, 7 ° where Justice
O'Connor joined an opinion holding that equal protection was not vio-
lated by provisions of Arizona's unemployment compensation scheme.
The challenged provisions, in effect, provided that unemployment entitle-
ments did not accrue during work performed for an employer from whom
one was already drawing a pension. The provisions were applied to deny
unemployment compensation to a civilian employee of the Department of
Defense who had been drawing a military pension, on the ground that all
United States entities are a single employer. The court assumed that Ari-
zona would provide benefits "to federal employees who were recipients of
65. Id at 535.
66. Id at 537.
67. Id at 536.
68. O'Connor, supra note 12, at 806.
69. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
70. 128 Ariz. 337, 625 P.2d 926 (Ct. App. Div. 1, 1981).
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social security or railroad retirement pensions"7 but held that the discrim-
ination was permissible because "most wages for previous work, on which
social security and railroad retirement pay are based, accrued from em-
ployment by private industry, not from employment by the United States
Government."72
Justice O'Connor showed more willingness to examine economic im-
pacts in her other significant equal protection opinion. In Blair v. Stump,73
she held for a unanimous court that ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1179
violated the equal protection clause in providing that a tenant who had lost
a forcible detainer action in justice court was required to post a bond
"equal to double the yearly value or rental of the premises in dispute"
upon appealing to the superior court. The bond was to guarantee payment
of "all costs and damages which may be adjudged against [the appellant]."
By contrast, a tenant appealing from a similar action in the superior court
was simply required to post a bond covering rental value of the premises
pending appeal. Justice O'Connor held that the double bond requirement
was invalid under Lindsey v. Normet74 because it was "unrelated to the
actual rent accruing or to the specific damage sustained by the landlord
when the judgment is appealed" and because "it prevents nonfrivolous ap-
peals by those who are unable to post the bond, while allowing other mer-
itless appeals by those who can afford the bond."75
III. CONCLUSION
There is every reason to expect that Justice O'Connor will fully appreci-
ate the interests of state and local governments advanced before the
Supreme Court. However, her voting record on the state bench suggests
that appreciation will not necessarily translate into votes, and her early
votes on the Supreme Court give reason to believe that she may join the
ranks of the Court's swing votes. Thus, the conscientious advocate must be
prepared to persuade her on the merits of each specific case. Helpful clues
to her proclivities may be available in her lower court voting, although
finding clues will be more difficult than it would have been had she been
elevated from a lower federal court.
71. Id at 341, 625 P.2d at 930.
72. Id at 342, 625 P.2d at 931.
73. 127 Ariz. 7, 617 P.2d 791 (Ct. App. Div. 1, 1980).
74. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
75. 127 Ariz. at 10, 617 P.2d at 794.
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